




Growth in transnational commerce and travel has substantially increased the
cases in which injury-causing products have significant contacts with more
than one state. A defective automobile is manufactured in Italy, by an Italian
company, and exported to France; it is purchased by a French student who
drives it to Oxford, where a defect in the steering causes an accident and in-
jury. Or, an Englishman on a business trip to Italy buys a box of Swiss
chocolate, eats the candy during a stopover in Paris, and falls ill on arrival
back in London; as a result of the illness, he is unable to go to New York to
conclude a profitable business deal. The special problems of multivictim ac-
cidents have also assumed larger importance. Airplane accidents, such as the
1974 crash in Paris of the Douglas DC-10 owned by the Turkish Air Line, have
been a particularly prolific source of product liability litigation.'
When the injured driver, the sick candy eater or the heirs of the deceased air
travellers sue the producers of the defective product, the court hearing the ac-
tion will be faced with several competing laws which claim to "govern" the
parties' rights and duties. The transnational character of such controverted
events will force the forum to choose an applicable law as to any issue on
which the susbstantive standards of the relevant states are not the same. Issues
on which national norms diverge include burden of proof, statute of limita-
tions, whether damages may be awarded for pain and suffering, and whether
there will be recovery at all, based on strict liability for the defect or on a show-
ing of negligence on the part of the manufacturer.
The first observation which should be made is that there is little law on
point. Preliminary to the drafting of the 1972 Hague treaty on choice of law
and products liability, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
sent out to member countries a questionnaire on their national choice of law
*Hughes Hubbard & Reed, Paris
'See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
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principles. Of the eighteen countries which responded, only two, Canada and
the United States, noted any statute or case law which dealt with conflicts
problems in the realm of product liability.'
Secondly, development of choice of law rules in the field of products liabil-
ity has been complicated by the classic view that the same choice of law rules
apply to all tortious acts regardless of subject matter: automobile accidents,
defamation, defective machines and the seduction of another man's woman,
have, until recently, all been seen as subject to a single rule. The classic doc-
trine in most American and Continental jurisdictions has been that of lex loci
delicti: the tort is to be governed by the law of the place where the wrong is
committed. Justice Holmes tried to explain this in 1904 in Slater v. Mexican
National Railroad Co. 3 by a theory of vested rights: the tort gave rise to what
Holmes called an obligatio, which the injured party carried around with him
wherever he went. This finds an echo in the formulation of the French rule,
which refers to the place where the obligation is generated: "loi locale du fait
g~nrateur de I'obligation."'
For some torts the lex loci delicti is easily ascertainable. For assault or seduc-
tion the place of wrong is quickly found. But it is quite often question-begging
to speak of "place of wrong" in the field of products liability. The elements of
the cause of action, in a case where it is necessary to choose between different
laws, will usually be spread over more than one place. The poisonous candy or
defective car is negligently manufactured in state X but causes injury in
state Y.
The First Restatement on Conflict of Laws took the position that the tort is
committed at the place of the last event necessary to make the actor liable.'
This is also the French doctrine.' The rule has the merit of ascertainability but
the obvious defect that the place of the last event might be completely for-
tuitous, as in the case of an airplane crash or an automobile accident.
The Federal Tort Claims Act takes the contrary view and subjects the United
States to tort liability under the law of "the place where the act or omission oc-
curred."'
The Second Restatement has avoided the issue by rejecting automatic ap-
plication of the lex loci delicti. The "proper law of the tort", according to the
Second Restatement, will be the law of the state with "the most significant
'CONFERENCE DE LA HAGUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvf, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA
DOUZIgME SESSION, Tome II, pp 64-91 (1974).
'194 U.S. 120 (1904).
'See BATIFFOL & LAGARDE, DROIT INT'L PRvt, No. 551-561. (Tome II, 6th ed.).
'§ 377.
'BATIFFOL & LAGARDE, supra note 3, No. 561.
'28 U.S.C. 1346(b). But see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) for a case of renvoi to
the lex loci delicti.
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relationship to the occurrence and the parties." ' In cases of personal injury,
the Second Restatement continues, the most significant relationship will usual-
ly be with the state where the injury occurs.'
The English rule is rather curious, and merits special treatment. While no
English case or statute law deals directly with choice of law problems in the
realm of products liability, general principles have been developed in cases
dealing with maritime collision,10 assault,' defamation12 and motor vehicle ac-
cidents.13 As generally formulated,' the rule is that an act done in a foreign
country is actionable as a tort in England only if (i) it is a tort under English
law and (ii) it is actionable according to the law of the foreign country where
committed.
Applied to international product liability conflicts, the English rule has
some questionable consequences. Let us assume that the foreign branch of an
English candy-maker manufactures and sells, in Azania to an Azania resident,
a bad box of chocolates. The Azanian consumer dies. His heirs sue the
manufacturer in London. And let us assume liability under Azanian but not
English law. In this case, despite Azania's obviously more significant connec-
tion with the occurrence and the parties, and despite the fact that all elements
of the alleged tort were committed in Azania, an English forum would still
deny recovery."
In the reverse situation, where England, but not Azania, would grant
recovery, the result is less certain. Until recently, an English court could grant
recovery for a tort committed abroad if the conduct was actionable under
English law and "not justifiable" in the country where committed. Not
justifiable was interpreted as meaning "wrongful" or "not innocent." And
since conduct might be "wrongful" without giving rise to civil liability,
English courts gave recovery in cases where the lex loci delicti would not. In
Machado v. Fontes,"1 libel in a Portugese language pamphlet published in
Brazil was held civilly actionable in England even though it was assumed that
under Brazilian law no damages would have been awarded to the defamed
plaintiff. Libel was a violation of the Brazilian penal code, and so the court
reasoned that the libellous statement was "not justifiable" in Brazil; thus
'§ 145. The "proper law" concept was initially advanced by the British scholar J.H.C. Morris in
The Proper Law of the Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 884 (1951).
'§ 146.
"The Halley (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193.
'Phillips v. Eyre (1870) K.R. 6 Q.B.I.
"Machado v. Fontes (1897) 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.).
"Chaplin v. Boys (1971) A.C. 356 (H.L.).
"DicEy & MORRIS. CONFLicr OF LAWS (9th ed.) Rule 178, at 938.
"See The Halley, supra, note 9.
"Supra, note 11.
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recovery was allowed in England. without establishing actionability under the
lex loci delicti.
Let us assume that Azania provided a fine for unsanitary conditions in a
chocolate factory but did not require the factory to compensate (civilly) the
victims of the dirty kitchens. Following the rule in Machado v. Fontes, the
English court might have said that the filthy factory was "not justifiable"
under the local law; thus the tort would have been actionable under English
law, although not so under the law of the place where it was committed, which
had the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.
In 1971, however, the House of Lords criticized Machado v. Fontes. The
case of Chaplin v. Boys 7 concerned a motor vehicle accident, in Malta, in
which a British soldier (Chaplin) in a car ran over a British airman (Boys) on a
motorcycle. Under the law of both Malta and England a tort had been com-
mitted. But under the Maltese civil code, the unfortunate Mr. Boys could
recover only 153, his out-of-pocket expenses. In England he would have gotten
an extra 12,250 for pain and suffering. The House of Lords allowed damages
to be granted according to English law. The holding of Chaplin v. Boys is not
inconsistent with the holding of Machado v. Fontes. In both cases damages
were awarded according to the law of the forum, England, which would not
have been given according to the lex loci delicti. But in its decision, the Law
Lords said clearly that the rule of Machado v. Fontes was wrong. It is
therefore now open to an English court to depart from Machado v. Fontes,
and to make actionability under the lex loci delicti a sine qua non of recovery
in England.
The English rule, both before and after Chaplin v. Boys, still requires a
determination of the place of wrong. This is no mean task when different
elements of the cause of action occur in different countries. The issue is ad-
dressed by a decision of the Court of Appeal, dealing not with choice of law,
but with jurisdiction. Under Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
notice of a writ may be served outside England in an action based on a tort
committed within England. In George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and
Chemical Corporation, " a New York company sold rat poison to an English
chain drug store, which sold it to a county government. The county in turn
used it on the land of a local farmer. It is not known whether the chemical had
the desired effect on the rats, but it did have an undesired effect on the
farmer's livestock. It was alleged that the American manufacturer had been
negligent in not properly labelling the product with a warning of the dangers of
using the substance without certain precautions. The Court of Appeal held
"Supra, note 12.
"(1944) K.B. 432 C.A.
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that there had been no tort committed within England, and thus it was not per-
missible to serve notice of a writ in New York. A similar result was reached in
the Canadian case of Abbot-Smith v. Governors of the University of
Toronto, 1" where a resident of Nova Scotia suffered injury from taking an oral
polio vaccine manufactured in Ontario by the University of Toronto.
In general, application of the lex loci delicti will give satisfactory results
when the situs of the wrong is ascertainable. There are situations, however,
such as the malfunction of an automobile or airplane, where the law selected
may have no connection with the interested states.
Each of the other choice of law rules is unsuitable for the field of products
liability. The large measure of discretion given to a judge under the "proper
law of the tort" or "most significant relationship" theory produces uncertain-
ty and insecurity, which can be expected to increase litigation and impede set-
tlement between insurers." The application of the law of the forum (which,
with a modification, is essentially the English rule) gives ascertainable results,
but at the price of determining liability according to rules which may have no
relation to the controverted event.
In response to this uncertain and undesirable state of affairs, the Hague
Conference on Private International Law drafted a treaty setting forth rules
designed to result in both (i) predictability of choice and (ii) a reasonable nexus
between the applicable law and the controverted event. The Hague Convention
on the law applicable to product liability was approved by the Conference in
October 1972 and has been signed by eight European countries,' three of
which, Norway, Yugoslavia and, most recently, France, have ratified it to
date.
The convention must be treated by each contracting state as a uniform law.
It applies regardless of reciprocity and even if neither the parties nor the ap-
plicable law are of another contracting state. Thus a French tribunal, hearing a
case brought by an Englishman against a French company whose product he
purchased in London would be obliged to apply English law even though the
United Kingdom is not a party to the treaty.
The Conference considered the laws whose application might be appropriate
to the ends which a conflicts rule should serve. The relevant contacts which
were considered included-
1. the place of injury, which might be the place of consumption or use, the
9(1964) 45 D.L.R. (2d) 672.
"See, e.g., how during the last decade the New York Court of Appeals wavered back and forth
concerning car accidents and guest statutes. Babcock v. Jackson 12 N.Y.(2d) 473 (1963); Dym v.
Gordon 16 N.Y.2d 120 (1965); Tooker v. Lopez 24 N.Y.2d 569 (1969).
"Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands. See
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI, January/March 1977, at 30.
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place where damage occurred, or the place where the consequences of the
tortious act were felt;
2. the place of manufacture;
3. the place at which the product was last offered to the public;
4. the place of the victim's residence;
5. the place of foreseeable distribution of the product; and,
6. the place whose law was most favorable to the victim.
The basic scheme of the treaty, contained in Articles 4-7, rests on two
postulates: first, that no single contact should be determinative, but that
choice of law should be the result of a combination of contacts; and second,
that the applicable law should always be reasonably foreseeable by the
manufacturer.
The treaty designated two principal "connecting factors": 1) location of in-
jury, and 2) residence of the victim, one of which would be the place of ap-
plicable law when coincidental with other designated factors.
The law of the place of injury is applicable when it is also that of either (i)
the place of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage, (ii)
the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable or (iii) the
place where the product was acquired by the person directly suffering
damage.22 On the other hand, the law of the habitual residence of the victim
will be applicable if it coincides with that of either (i) the place where the
product was acquired by the person directly suffering the damage, or (ii) the
principal place of business of the manufacturer or supplier (the person alleged
to be liable)., 3 In case of conflict, the habitual residence of the victim takes
precedence over the place of injury.
So if a man from Cape Cod goes to Paris on holiday, and there slits his
throat with a defective Boston-made razor, purchased and used in his Paris
hotel, a tribunal applying the treaty's provisions to an action against the
Boston-based company would be bound to apply Massachusetts law.
There are, of course, instances where none of the contemplated combina-
tions of contact points will occur; for example, if an American buys an
English-made car in Monte-Carlo, and is injured while taking a jaunt into
Italy. In an action against the manufacturer, neither of the combinations of
contacts exists. The place of injury, Italy, is not that of victim's residence,
manufacturer's principal place of business or the place of purchase. And the
place of victim's residence does not coincide with the place of purchase or the
manufacturer's principal place of business. In this case the victim would be
given an option, under Article 6 of the treaty, to choose either English law (as
"Article 4.
"Article 5.
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the law of the principal place of business of the manufacturer), or the law of
Italy (as the place of injury).
The victim's choice is limited, however, in that neither the place of injury
nor the residence of the victim may be selected unless reasonably foreseeable,
by the person claimed to be liable, as a state where the product in question, or
his own products of the same type, would be made available through normal
commercial channels.2 ' As will be discussed later, this rule is of particular im-
portance in the application of the treaty to a territorially large federal system
such as that of the United States.
While the convention applies to all persons suffering damage, only the per-
son directly suffering damage is given significance in the choice of the ap-
plicable law. So if a resident of England lends his car to his father, resident in
France, and a defect in the car causes injury to the father in Paris, French law
is applicable regardless of whether the action is brought by the father or the
son.
The treaty does not define the term "place of injury." The explanatory
report of the Conference Rapporteur, Willis Reese, takes the position that the
first impact of the defendant's wrongful act will normally be the critical ele-
ment in determining the place of injury. In an action against the negligent
manufacturer of an automobile, therefore, the critical element would be the
place of the accident.
What happens, however, when the damage does not manifest itself im-
mediately? An Englishman on a Continental holiday may consume bad food
in Italy, but fall ill only on arrival in Paris on the next leg of his trip. In this
case, the treaty is probably flexible enough to allow a judge to select either
location as the place of injury.
But suppose the gravity or the extent of the injury becomes clear only after
the victim has travelled to yet another jurisdiction? For example, the condition
of the vacationing Englishman might become worse after return home to Lon-
don. In such a situation, England would probably not be considered as a place
of injury, at least not by the Conference Rapporteur.
While focusing on the place of injury, it might be worth considering whether
its law should ever be chosen as the applicable law. It might be simpler and bet-
ter to have only two alternatives: (i) the law of the consumer's habitual
residence or (ii) the law of the manufacturer's principal place of business. The
manufacturer would still be protected, under such a scheme, against an "un-
foreseeable law," by virtue of the requirement that it be reasonably fore-
seeable that the manufacturer's products of the same type would be made
available in the state where the victim lives.
2
'Article 7.
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The treaty covers only extra-contractual liability. Article I of the treaty says
it is inapplicable to actions against the direct transferor of the product. Liabil-
ity between contracting parties inter se is covered by existing (non-treaty) rules.
The Conference felt that contract obligations were adequately covered by ex-
isting law, and that to disturb the present pattern would lessen chances for
adoption of the treaty.
Damage to property and out-of-pocket losses are covered by the treaty, but
may be recovered only if accompanied by other damage.25 For example,
assume that a defect in a car causes a breakdown while a man is driving to an
important business meeting. As a result of the breakdown he loses a lucrative
contract. Neither the right to the cost of repairs of the car nor the right to lost
business would be covered by the treaty unless the driver has also suffered per-
sonal injury. If he is injured, then all three types of loss are considered as
"damage" under the treaty.
Damage covered by the treaty may be the result of a defect in the product, a
misdescription, or failure to give adequate information concerning the
product's characteristics. Therefore the treaty would apply to the claim of the
Shropshire farmer, in George Monro Ltd,2" for loss from the American rat
poison which was not accompanied by a cautionary label.
The scope of the convention is wide as to both persons and products.
"Product" means agricultural as well as industrial goods." Potential de-
fendants include not only manufacturers and producers, but also suppliers,
even gratuitous, and repairmen in the commercial chain of distribution."8
The legal issues to which the treaty is applicable are also given broad scope.
The questions submitted to the treaty-selected law include-
(i) the basis of liability,
(ii) the exemptions from liability (e.g., Act of God or force majeure
defenses);
(iii) the amount and kinds of damages (e.g., whether there is recovery for
pain and suffering or emotional distress);
(iv) whether damages may be assigned or inherited;
(v) the vicarious liability of principals for the torts of their agents or
employees;
(vi) rules of prescription and limitation relating to the commencement of
the action, and, very important,
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In applying a single law to all issues the treaty may fall short of at least one
of the policies which are supposed to govern choice of law rules. A court
should attempt to apply the law of the state with the dominant interest as to
the issue to be adjudicated. As legal issues differ, so may the state which has
the paramount interest in the application of its law. For example, assume that
a resident of state X purchases an automobile from a manufacturer in
neighbouring state Y, where he is killed in an accident while driving home. It
may be reasonable that the law of the state of injury should govern the basis
and extent of the manufacturer's liability. But why should the law of state Y
also determine whether the wife or child of the victim may sue for their loss by
reason of the death of the husband or father? While simplicity is obviously to
be desired, quaere whether its virtues are not outweighed by the benefits of a
dipcage by which different issues are referred to the laws of different states.
The convention is silent as to whether the victim has a direct right of action
against the insurer. And it is concerned only with choice of substantive law,
not with judicial jurisdiction or with recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.
By declaring a rule contrary to the forum's public policy, courts have on oc-
casion avoided application of the foreign law selected by their conflicts prin-
ciples.3 0 The Convention permits the use of this escape hatch only when the
foreign law is manifestly repugnant to a fundamental principle of the forum's
law or morals. In the view of the Conference Rapporteur, recourse to this ex-
ception would not be legitimate merely because of a difference in the size of
damages which would be awarded under the foreign law.3
One area which should be of special interest to American lawyers is the ap-
plication of the treaty to a country composed of territorial units each having its
own products liability rules. The treaty considers each political subdivision of
a federal system to be a separate state for choice of law purposes., 2 Although
clearly right, this approach may result in a federal system being under greater
obligation to apply foreign law than would a country with a uniform legal
system.
As an illustration, assume that a custom-made Italian sports car is exported
to New York, where it is bought by a Connecticut resident who takes the car
on a cross-country vacation. A defect in the steering causes an accident in
North Dakota. If the United States had a uniform legal system, United States
law would apply; the place of injury, the place of purchase and the residence
of the victim would all have been the same. But because each state has its own
"
0See Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, 422 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
3 See Explanatory Report by W.L.M. Reese, ACRES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA DOUZItME SESSION DE
LA CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI, Tome 111, at 269 (1974).
"Article 12.
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law, the treaty provisions, in this case, will select foreign law. The law of the
victim's residence, Connecticut, will not be applied because there are no other
connecting points with that state. For the same reason neither would the law of
North Dakota, place of injury. The plaintiff's special option to choose the
place of injury regardless of lack of other contacts would not be exercisable if
the foreign manufacturer could show that it was not reasonably foreseeable
that sports cars of this type would be sold in North Dakota through normal
commercial channels. So, the only law left to the plaintiff is Italian, as that of
the manufacturer's principal place of business.
To avoid this type of situation, the treaty provides that a federal state is not
bound to apply the treaty rules unless a unified legal system, in the same cir-
cumstances, would have applied a law other than its own. If the nations in the
above hypothetical had been reversed, Italy would have applied its own law.
Therefore the American state in which the case is brought would be free to
select the applicable law by its own choice of law principles, without regard to
the treaty.
What ought to be the attitude of American lawyers toward the treaty? As
transnational commerce grows, so do the chances that consumers will be in-
jured by products manufactured in foreign countries by foreign manufac-
turers. The present confusion in choice of law rules constitutes an impediment
to settlement of claims arising out of these injuries. A uniform set of choice of
law rules has thus become imperative.
Considering exclusively American interests, the design and scheme of the
Hague convention will be generally beneficial to both American consumers
and American manufacturers. The victim's habitual residence is at the top of
the treaty's hierarchy of criteria for selecting the applicable law. Because
American product liability law is on the whole stricter and more developed
than that of our principal trading partners, the preference for the victim's
residence means that an American plaintiff will usually get the benefit of our
protective laws. Therefore, one effect of adoption of the treaty by the United
States might be to raise the standards of care of foreign manufacturers. But an
American manufacturer, sued by a foreign consumer, will usually be subject to
the less stringent rules of the country where the foreign plaintiff resides and
where the product was marketed.
The treaty rules are precise, and thus give a predictability of result which is
essential to settlement between insurers. And because selection of an ap-
plicable law requires the coincidence of a combination of contact points, the
designated law usually will in fact have a significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties.
Admittedly the treaty rules are too mechanical. There will be cases where
they do not produce substantive justice. Moreover, the treaty begs important
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questions about the nature of tort law: in particular, whether it should be a
vehicle for changing behaviour by imposing civil sanctions against those mak-
ing defective products, as well as compensating persons injured through the
use of such products.
But all benefits have a cost. The hindrance to efficient settlement of disputes
that results from the uncertainties of the present choice of law rules may exact
an even higher price than do the treaty's defects.
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